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MEMOIRS OF A GENERAL IN THE
INGLORIOUS REVOLUTION
Lawrence G. Sager*
ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT. By Charles Fried. New York: Simon & Schuster.

1991. Pp. 256. $19.95.
I

Conservative constitutional theory has been marked by an unwillingness to confront questions of political morality head on. Conservatives have too often proffered an implausible, denatured view of
constitutional adjudication that sees judges as glorified meter readers
whose job is to report what they have found in the basement of history. Committed to a thin account of democracy that bows unreflectively to majoritarian political processes, these theorists have insisted
that judges have only the license to recover the decisions made by historical constitutional majorities and encrypted in the text of the
Constitution.
This view, sometimes called originalism, fails to capture the actual
practice of constitutional decisionmaking as it is today, as it has ever
been, or indeed, as it could be: the text and historical context of the
Constitution cannot yield answers to questions of meaning without engaging judgments of political value on the part of those who undertake
its interpretation.
Without bending originalism well past its breaking point, conservative constitutional critics cannot explain even the core of our constitutional tradition. They cannot explain, for example, the institution
of judicial review itself, or the application of the Bill of Rights - originally directed at federal conduct exclusively ~ to the states, or the
central details of our commitment to free speech. Persuasive discourse
about any of these involves locating the matter at issue within an attractive account of the Constitution and our constitutional tradition;
and judgments of political value are the stuff of which such an account
must be built. Even more clearly, conservative commentators can take
no support from the originalist protocol they sponsor for their own
constitutional projects, like resisting affirmative action.
Some constitutional conservatives, faced with these looming difficulties, have led uneasy theoretical double lives. Quietly, these theo• Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1963, Pomona College; LL.B. 1966, Columbia. - Ed.
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rists have commuted to more plausible understandings of
constitutional adjudication in order to explain the elementary premises
of our constitutional tradition and to advance their political agenda.
At the same time, they continue to pay lip service to the narrow premises of naive originalism in order to support their charge that judges
and commentators who have adopted more liberal views of the Constitution are not merely wrong but subversive - guilty of bending judicial authority undemocratically to their own political ends. Lost in
this theoretical handwaving is the opportunity for serious discussion of
the important constitutional disputes. 1
It is a welcome change, accordingly, to open Charles Fried's apologia for his term of office as Solicitor General of the United States and
encounter a far more realistic and attractive view of constitutional adjudication. Fried acknowledges that the objections to originalism are
"devastating" (p. 62), and emphasizes that the Constitution must be
subject to the same rich canons of interpretation as other legal sources
(p. 64).
He takes as the model of good judging Justice Harlan's opinion in
Poe v. Ullman 2 defending the right of married couples to resist Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives. Justice Black, who criticized Harlan's approach in Poe as ethical adventurism, is dismissed by
Fried as pursuing "[an] anti-intellectual, textual fundamentalism,"
while Harlan is celebrated for his "belief in the possibility - indeed,
inevitability - of reasoning and judgment in applying the Constitution" (p. 73). Sounding more like a disciple of Ronald Dworkin than a
general in the Reagan revolution, Fried describes what he sees as the
ground that he and Harlan share:
In interpreting the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Constitution as a whole should serve as a guide. The particular guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights are like the points on a graph, which
the judge joins by a line to describe a coherent and rationally compelling
function. [p. 74]

Asking for nothing more than "a conception of law disciplined by
a respect for tradition, professionalism, and careful, candid reasoning"
(p. 70), Fried emphatically rejects originalism's infatuation with majority rule:
I am puzzled by the originalist celebration of majority rule as the presumed default source of law, from which one may only depart on the
clearest textual warrant in the Constitution, a warrant underwritten by
the intent of the framers. The originalists belong to the party of liberty
- as do I - so it is odd to see them repair to majority rule, which has
not often been seen as a very secure haven of liberty, and certainly was
1. I defend and elaborate on these complaints in the course of a critique of the views of
Robert Bork, who is regarded by many as the founding spokesperson of originalism. See Lawrence Sager, Back to Bork, N.Y. REV. BKS., Oct. 25, 1990, at 23.
2. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), discussed at pp. 72-75.
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not seen as such by the framers. The framing generation would soon
have the French Revolution to show that majority rule, pure and direct,
was a will-o'-the-wisp, the pursuit of which could only end in calamity
for justice, for tranquility, for prosperity, for liberty - the things they
really cared about. The sense in which the Constitution is based on the
consent of the governed is complex and structured. The authority, powers, and methods of John Marshall's judiciary were - and are - entirely appropriate to it. [pp. 67-68]

But hold the amens. As generous to modem understandings of
constitutional adjudication as all this may seem, Fried also insists from
the outset on his status as a bona fide revolutionary, leading the righteous battle on the field of legal theory. "In a real sense the Solicitor
General is responsible for the government's legal theories, its legal philosophy. And legal philosophy was at the heart of the Reagan Revolution" (pp. 14-15). And there is nothing namby-pamby about his
rhetorical swipes at the constitutional judiciary. His early salvos include characterizations of the pre-Reagan Supreme Court as "complicit in the aggrandizement of government [and] . . . a principal
engine for redistributing wealth and shackling the energies and enterprise of the productive sector" (p. 17), as guilty of "a mistaken approach to judging . . . that confused and threatened the ideal of the
rule of law" (p. 20), and as embracing, all in all, "a system of judging
that had run badly off the rails" (p. 57).
Two of Fried's three revolutionary targets are abortion and affirmative action. 3 Taken together, they represent the deepest source of
Fried's complaints about the pre-Reagan world of public law: Roe v.
Wade 4 is cast as the worst symptom of a judiciary that has lost its
bearings and perverted its role (pp. 20, 57, 75-88); while the pre-Reagan treatment of affirmative action inspires the charge that liberty has
been sacrificed to a judicially inspired scheme of egalitarian social engineering (pp. 20, 89-90, 93-101, 118-22).
We already have enough of Fried's battle plan in front of us to
appreciate the difficult campaign of justification he faces in his book.
On two levels, his positions threaten to contradict themselves. He has
forsaken naive originalism in favor of a sophisticated and robust un- ·
derstanding of constitutional adjudication, but he still undertakes to
establish Roe v. Wade as the glaring symptom of a fundamentally misguided approach to judging. At the same time Fried levels this deep
criticism of Roe and the pre-Reagan Court, he means to show that the
other critical failing in public law is that government, by endorsing
affirmative action, has usurped prerogatives that belong in the domain
of private choice.
3. The third is separation of powers in general and the Independent Counsel controversy in
particular. This issue does not engage Fried's harsh criticism of the judiciary.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Were he able at once to erp.brace a defensible model of constitutional adjudication and yet defend his fierce indictment of pre-Reagan
Supreme Court methodology, and were he able to justify his apparent
unconcern for the liberty of women to secure abortions while passionately advancing the cause of economic liberty, Fried would have accomplished something of considerable interest and importance. He
would have offered a serious, coherent defense of the modern conservative agenda, and thereby have enriched political discourse.
Unfortunately, Fried's memoir - breezy and literate as it is falls badly short of this ambition.
II

The abortion controversy lies at the center of Fried's problems; it
is the source of tension for both his methodological and substantive
claims. At the behest of the Reagan administration, Fried twice asked
the Supreme Court to overrule Roe. 5 He urged the Court then, and
urges his readers now, to see Roe as the wrongheaded decision of a
Court out of touch with its proper role in constitutional governance.
But he accepts Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 which invalidated a law
preventing married couples from buying or using contraceptives, as
well within the paradigm of good judging (pp. 85-86).
At the heart of Fried's attempt to establish an analytical chasm
between Griswold and Roe is a familiar argument: the Constitution is
"silent" on the question of the legal and moral status of the fetus,
neither insisting that the state protect fetal life as it would the life of a
person nor forbidding it from so doing; accordingly, protection of the
fetus takes place in an aconstitutional space where majority rule
should prevail. Where state legislatures have voted to usurp a woman's choice whether to bear the fetus she carries to term or to have it
aborted, they are entitled to the authority of their majoritarian status
as exercised over the question of fetal protection (pp. 77-78).
Obviously, this tidy equation is missing a crucial term: the unwilling pregnant woman, forced by the state to bear the fetus for nine
• months, to endure the physical and emotional consequences of both
pregnancy and delivery, and to face the impossible, inhuman choice
between unwelcome parenthood and abandonment of an infant child.
How exactly are we to understand the observation that the Constitution is silent on the legal or moral status of the fetus, in this context,
where silence is invoked in response to the claim of the unwilling pregnant woman that she is being treated unjustly when the state requires
her to carry the fetus to term?
5. Webster v. Reproductive HClllth Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), discussed at pp. 85-88;
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), dis·
cussed at pp. 33-35.
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Fried appears to be saying that, absent explicit material in the text
or context of the Constitution foreclosing the state from protecting
fetal life as it would human life, majoritarian process must prevail,
whatever the nature of the burden thereby imposed on women. So
understood, Fried adopts precisely the originalist position that he took
such pains to renounce earlier, the position that treats majority rule as
the presumptive state of our governance, yielding only to unmistakable commands of the Constitution. In so doing, Fried ignores important analytical possibilities excluded only by an originalist dogma that
he himself discredits.
He ignores, for example, the view - suggested by the much
maligned opinion of the Court in Roe - that the constitutionally
founded interests of women who suffer unwanted pregnancies should
prevail over an interest of the state in protecting the fetus, given the
absence of constitutional support for the state's characterization of the
fetus as human life and the absence of any nonconstitutional legal tradition, or any social consensus, regarding the fetus as a person.7
Refuge in originalism's obeisance to majority rule is so baldly contradictory of Fried's purported beliefs about the Constitution as to encourage a more charitable reading. In this spirit, we might understand
Fried's reference to the silence of the Constitution not as an argument
in itself, but as a way of stating the conclusion to an analysis of the
Constitution and our constitutional tradition - an analysis that takes
account both of the great and disproportionate burden of unwanted
pregnancies on women trying to chart lives for themselves, and of
Griswold v. Connecticut, yet still finds fault with Roe v. Wade.
To the extent that Fried has any such argument to offer, it is captured in his oral argument before the Supreme Court in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services. Appearing on behalf of the United
States, amicus curiae, Fried for the second time asked the Court to
overrule Roe. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy pressed Fried to explain how the liberty interest the Court recognized in Griswold could
suddenly collapse when abortion was at issue; Fried is sufficiently
pleased with his response to reprint it at length:
Justice O'Connor: Do you say there is no fundamental right to decide whether or not? ... to procreate?
A: I would hesitate to formulate the right in such abstract terms, and I
think the Court prior to Roe versus Wade quite prudently also avoided
such sweeping generalities. That was the wisdom of Griswold.
Justice O'Connor: Do you think that the state has the right to, if in a
future century we had a serious overpopulation problem, has a right to
require women to have abortions after so many children?
A: I surely do not. That would be quite a different matter.
Justice O'Connor: What do you rest that on?
7. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-62.
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A: Because unlike abortion, which involves the purposeful termination
of future life, that would involve not preventing an operation, but violently ... laying hands on a woman and submitting her to an operation

Justice O'Connor: And you would rest that on substantive due-process protection?
A: Absolutely.
Justice Kennedy: How do you define the liberty interest of the woman in that connection?
A: The liberty interest against a seizure would be concerned. That is
how the Court analyzed the matter in Griswold. That is how Justice
Harlan analyzed the matter in Poe v. Ullman which is, in some sense, the
root of this area of law....
Justice Kennedy: How would you define the ... liberty interest ...
of a woman in an abortion case?
A: I would define it in terms of the concrete impositions on the woman
which so offended the Court in Griswold and which are not present in the
Roe situation. [pp. 85-86; footnote omitted]

Remarkably, what Fried sees as distinguishing Roe from the natural reach of the liberty interest recognized in Griswold is the absence in
Roe of the "concrete impositions" suffered by married couples in Griswold. Similarly, what he sees as distinguishing Roe from Justice
O'Connor's compulsory abortion hypothetical is that compulsory
abortion would entail the state "laying hands on a woman and submitting her to an operation." It is hard to imagine what Professor Fried
could have in mind here. The idea that requiring a woman to endure a
pregnancy followed by the medical procedure of childbirth - a procedure that may require serious surgery - is less a "concrete imposition" on her, less a "laying hands on" her, than requiring her to
submit to an abortion, is simply wrong, at least in an age where the
stork and cabbage leaf are unavailable as mechanisms of delivery.
Even more demanding of his readers' credulity is Fried's assertion
that Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples
in Griswold constituted a more opprobrious imposition on women than
did Texas' restrictions on abortion in Roe. Fried at moments suggests
that Griswold should be particularized to the state's prying into marital intimacy (pp. 76-77), but he quickly concedes that the principles of
Griswold extend to Justice O'Connor's mandatory abortion hypothetical and to state attempts to outlaw homosexual conduct as well (pp.
82-84).

Fried simply has no basis consistent with his own premises for denying the reach of the liberty interest recognized in Griswold to a woman who suffers an unwanted pregnancy. To make sense of his
position, he can only repair to the offsetting concern of a state that
takes itself to be protecting the life of a person when it protects the life
of a fetus. But that could only be the beginning of his argument, not
the end. He would still have to explain how the Supreme Court could
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sensibly recognize that a woman suffering an unwanted pregnancy had
a Griswold-based liberty interest in abortion and yet concede to state
governments the capacity to define for themselves in the selective context of abortion the weight of the competing interest in the protection
of the fetus. s
So far we have taken at face value Fried's commitment to the proposition that he regards as central to an understanding of the Supreme
Court's failure in Roe v. Wade: state legislatures have the constitutional license to equate fetal life with the life of the person, and abortion with the taking of an innocent person's life. Our observations
have all spoken to the difficulty Fried has in justifying that position. If
he is serious about leaving the untenable protocol of originalism behind, his claim from the silence of the Constitution has to be dismissed
as a lapse of reason. If he means the reference to silence metaphorically, as a way of stating the conclusion to a process of reflection on
the relevant constitutional materials, then he collides with Griswold v.
Connecticut, which he himself lauds. But Fried's problems with abortion go still further. Not only is he unable to defend the idea that state
legislatures have license to define abortion as murder; he is also unable
to live with the natural consequences of that idea.
Having castigated the Supreme Court at length for its "infuriating" decision in Roe (p. 81 ), and having presented the curing of the
egregious judicial abuses exemplified by Roe as the issue most dear to
the Reagan revolutionaries whose banner he carried, Fried ends his
discussion of abortion with a remarkable set of qualifications to his
own theme:
[H]aving one day abandoned Roe, the Court may reasonably distinguish between statutes forbidding abortions outright and statutes requiring a delay of a few days in which a woman may consider alternatives to
abortion, which the clinic is obliged to tell her about; or between statutes
regulating abortion services and statutes punishing women who undergo
abortions. This last is a distinction that might have considerable practical importance with the greater availability of safe, simple, self-administered pharmaceuticals to induce early-term abortions. In fact, medical
8. Fried might resist this analytical structure, and argue that the Griswold liberty interest is
similar in form to the liberty famously argued for by John Stuart Mill. For Mill, it was the
absence of a certain sort of collective interest, the avoidance of harm to other persons, that made
some collective restraints on behavior improper. In Mill's own words, "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others." JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON
LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (H.B. Acton ed.,
J.M. Dent & Sons 1972) (1859). Fried might understand Griswold in this way, and see the state's
interest in protecting fetal life as the life of a person as voiding a claim from Griswold rather than
offsetting it. But this view of things gives Fried no help. If anything, it puts more pressure still
on the idea that a state legislature can justify its restraints on abortion by deeming the extinction
of fetal life to be the equivalent of murder; on that account, a state, rather than the Supreme
Court, decides whether Griswold applies. Moreover, this view of Griswold is at odds with Fried's
response to Justice O'Connor, which concedes that Griswold would apply to mandated abortion
even if it were imposed in the interest of preventing the harms of overpopulation.
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discoveries might then make this whole constitutional episode moot. [p.
87]

Suddenly, nothing in Fried's position seems to hold. Women
surely should be constitutionally entitled to obtain and use medicines
or other safe devices to induce early-term abortions; 9 and statutes that
broadly forbid abortions surely should not survive Supreme Court
scrutiny. Fried makes his position seem more reasonable by acknowledging as much here. But neither of these propositions is consistent
with his attack on Roe, which depends on the claim that state legislatures are entitled to treat fetuses as persons and abortion as the taking
of an innocent person's life. 10 Were state legislatures able to declare
the fetus a person, they would in turn be able to protect the fetus
against abortifacients; had Fried persuaded the Supreme Court to
adopt his view of state legislative authority, his qualifications would
have been thereby undone.

Ill
When Fried turns to his second target, affirmative action, he leaves
behind any thought that an absence of a clear constitutional mandate
invites deference to legislative judgement. Fried concedes that ours is
a "society that had practiced public and private apartheid" (p. 99),
inflicting "centuries of deprivation" (p. 100) on black Americans. But
he sees affirmative action - including Title VII doctrine, which in his
view induces employers to adopt racial preferences - as angering
whites, demoralizing blacks, and fostering "a bureaucratic-collectivist
state" (p. 105). His passion, oddly suppressed when the matter at issue is the plight of women who suffer unwanted pregnancies, is fully
engaged here: within seven pages he is moved on three occasions to
characterize the "left-collectivism" (p. 101) of affirmative action as
"sinister" (pp. 99, 100, 105).
The efficacy and wisdom of affirmative action programs is a matter
on which well-meaning persons can disagree; we ought to welcome
debate, even passionate and hyperbolic debate, when the stakes are so
high and the issues so complex. But Fried means to argue that affirmative action programs are very often unconstitutional, not merely unwise. Even the most robust view of constitutional interpretation
9. The most prominent pharmaceutical option now available in Europe, but not the United
States, is RU 486. RU 486, properly considered, does not induce abortions at all, or operate to
the detriment of a fetus, since it acts to prevent implantation of the fertilized egg by suppressing
the hormone progesterone. See generally Jane M. Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 1235, 1254-56 (1989).
Ethical controversy over the status of the fetus could be enlarged, of course, to include the
fertilized egg prior to implantation; this can only place still greater strain on the idea that state
legislatures are free to bless a prenatal entity with personhood.
10. For a similar critique of the contradictory nature of Fried's moderating premises, see
Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Supreme Court, N.Y. REV. BKS., July 18,
1991, at 23.
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insists on something more than the invocation of the specter of "leftcollectivism" to explain why governmental entities should be barred
from the effort to redress the disgraceful consequences of slavery and
discrimination.
Fried finds the basis of his constitutional attack in a principle that
he proffers early on but never defends at length: "the basic right of
every person to be considered as a distinct individual and not in terms
of the groups to which the government says he belongs" (p. 90). Accordingly, government should never adopt a program that prefers or
disprefers persons or enterprises on the ground of race. Even remedies
for past wrongs are unconstitutional on this view, unless they return
the individuals benefited or harmed by unlawful discrimination to the
positions they would have occupied absent that discrimination.
Describing the Reagan administration's endorsement of this view
as the basis of its campaign against affirmative action, Fried celebrates
it as the policy of "color-blindness" and invokes the famous dissent of
the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson: "[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 11 Fried is careful - though his readers could easily miss the
implicit disclaimer - to appropriate Harlan's color-blind Constitution
only as a "good slogan" (p. 101). He could not plausibly depend on
Harlan for more: it surely does not follow from the unconstitutionality of a legally enforced caste system that race-conscious efforts to efface the residue of caste are unconstitutional.
It was precisely the effacement of the residue of caste, of course,
that was at hazard when the Reagan administration advanced its version of the color-blind Constitution. In the name of "color-blindness,"
for example, Fried appeared for the United States in City ofRichmond
v. Croson 12 to argue successfully that it was unconstitutional for Richmond to set aside thirty percent of its construction contracts for minority-owned businesses. And in the name of that precept, Fried set
out to "tame" (p. 121) the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v.

Duke Power Co. 13
Griggs held that a facially neutral, benignly motivated employment
practice that disproportionately excludes minorities from the
workforce violates Title VII unless it is justified by a "business necessity." Fried's complaint about Griggs and cases that have followed its
lead is indirect: he worries that employers whose work forces have a
slender complement of persons of color will be moved by fears of Title
VII liability voluntarily to create employment preferences aimed at
11. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1?96) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted at p. 101.
12. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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bolstering their numbers (pp. 94-95). Fried looked for an opportunity
to chip away at the Griggs line of cases and found it in the 1989 case
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 14
Wards Cove vividly illustrates how poorly suited limited antidiscrimination principles are to the task of undoing the entrenched consequences of racism. Characteristic of the industry of which they are a
part - seasonal salmon canning in Alaska - the two enterprises challenged under Title VII in Wards Cove were vividly stratified along racial lines. The canneries staffed their assembly lines almost exclusively
with Filipinos and Alaska Natives. The other jobs - better paid work
ranging from dock labor and construction to carpentry, cooking,
storekeeping, and bookkeeping - were predominately held by whites.
The cannery line workers were housed in separate dormitories and fed
in separate mess halls, facilities which, at least in the eyes of the four
dissenting justices, were distinctly inferior. 15 The cannery line workers were hired through a union local or from nearby Native Alaskan
villages. The noncannery jobs were not advertised or filled in any systematic or competitive way. There was no in-house training and no
promotion from the cannery line to the noncannery jobs. The salmon
gutting machine, unhappily, was known as the "iron chink" (p. 122).
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, Justice Stevens was moved to characterize the employment regime as a
"plantation economy."16
Fried sees it as "obvious that the Philippine workers were not the
victims of discrimination" (p. 122). He is blind to the possibility that
what he dismisses as the "nasty" but irrelevant details of a "racially
segmented" work force (p. 122) are the unhappy product of a history
of racial discrimination that we could and should work to unmake,
and that the workers on the cannery line are indeed the victims of our
history. It was a limited vision much like Fried's that drove the fiveJustice majority in Wards Cove to render the industrywide practices
there virtually invulnerable to attack under Title VII and that, in tum,
prompted Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, to wonder "whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a problem in our
society, or even remembers that it ever was." 17
The Reagan approach championed by Fried is not color-blind, at
least in the sense intended by the elder Justice Harlan; it is historyblind. No one familiar with even the rough outlines of American history could deny that profound injustices have been systematically vis14. 490 U.S.
15. See 490
dissenting).
16. 490 U.S.
17. 490 U.S.

642 (1989).
U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 490 U.S. at 663 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ited on a variety of racial groups during the modem settlement,
domestication, and industrialization of our nation; and no one who
lives in our world and accepts the evidence of his or her senses could
believe that we have purged ourselves of the consequences of this sorry
history. Disadvantage, distrust, and distaste have been passed from
generation to generation, leaving our society sharply and unjustly divided along the fault lines of race.
For decades, the question how best to proceed in the face of this
blunt reality has preoccupied many who are committed to change, including responsible governmental officials. But if persons have the
right never to be made worse off by government on account of their
race than they would have been absent unlawful discrimination, then
redress for most of the consequences of our history of discrimination is
barred. History-blindness countenances reparations only for the specific, identifiable victims of discrimination themselves and at the
expense of the specific, identifiable beneficiaries; accordingly, governmental entities violate the Constitution if they try to undo any but the
most proximate, traceable artifacts of their own discrimination. Having failed for much of our history to protect against what Fried· himself characterizes as public and private apartheid, the Constitution
now is made vigilant against attempts to undo the consequences of
that apartheid that reach beyond local and immediate wrongdoing.
The appeal of the history-blind Constitution is far from self-evident. The ambition of dismantling the consequences of race discrimination shares no moral ground with that of maintaining white
·supremacy in a segregated society: while the latter is despicable and
unconstitutional, the former is one of the most distinguished ends toward which governmental authority can be directed. Accordingly,
nothing in the esteemed tradition we associate with Brown v. Board of
Education 18 can be taken as supportive of history-blindness. That
view must depend for its justification on a different and problematic
claim: that persons disfavored on account of their race in the service
of dismantling the consequences of prior discrimination are thereby
done an injustice, unless they were themselves direct beneficiaries of
prior racial discrimination.
But when government works to achieve legitimate ends, it often
must establish criteria in furtherance of those ends, criteria that prefer
some and disfavor others. 19 Unless those criteria are independently
ruled out, we judge their propriety in terms of their connection to the
ends they serve. A history-blin¢1 view of affirmative action depends on
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. A state academic institution, for example, might favor some applicants because of: (a)
their geographic origins or intention to locate professionally in poorly serviced areas; (b) their
demonstrated commitments to work in the public interest as they perceive it; or (c) their sustained development in other endeavors such as musical performance or athletics.
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the unsupported view that racial criteria are inherently unjust, no matter what end they serve.
Fried offers no real defense of this, either as a matter of political
justice or constitutional law; indeed, as the burden of our discussion
suggests, it is far from apparent that a defense can be found. And
remarkably, Fried's commitment to history-blindness, upon which his
constitutional attack on affirmative action depends, is every bit as unstable as is his commitment to legislative authority over the status of
the fetus, upon which his attack on Roe depends.
Fried takes pains to distinguish himself from the many other Reagan warriors who took a stricter line with regard to the precepts of
color-blindness. Fried, for example, argues that communities that
have discriminatorily awarded municipal construction contracts in the
past, or that can point to "specific and identifiable" past discrimination within the local construction industry, can constitutionally favor
minority-owned construction companies with set-aside requirements
of the sort at issue in Croson (pp. 127-28). This, of course, contradicts
the view that it is unconstitutional to disfavor anyone by virtue of their
race except to the extent that they were personally the beneficiaries of
past discrimination. That a community itself engaged in past discrimination, or that a community is addressing "specific and identifiable"
discrimination by others, does not warrant that only the people
harmed by past discrimination will be aided now or that only people
benefited by past discrimination will be harmed now.

IV
One is tempted to be tolerant of this muddled moderation. Coherence aside, it seems more savory than rigid adherence to the principles
of history-blindness and state legislative authority over fetal status;
neither of these principles, after all, is defensible. In an earlier era,
there was a joke attributed to Eastern Europe in which communist hell
was preferred to capitalist hell because of its great inefficiency. In a
similar vein, a flawed acolyte of modem conservatism may look better
than a true believer.
Indeed, there is a reason for being more sympathetic still. A plausible understanding of the gaps in reason within his memoir is that
Professor Fried, at least in retrospect, is drawn to human values suppressed by the revolutionary manifesto of Reagan conservatism that he ultimately refuses to be bound by the logic of a failed moral
geometry.
But there are at least three important reasons to emphasize the
structural flaws in Fried's case. The first, of less global consequence
than the others, concerns a leitmotif of Brennan-bashing. At a
number of points, Fried faults Justice Brennan, and always for the
same delict: surreptitiously advancing his political agenda at the price
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of clear reason. 20 It is irksome to encounter these repeated and derogatory references to a luminary jurist in a work so vulnerable to precisely the same charge.
The second reason involves the connection in normative discourse
between coherence and reason. Fried aims not merely to provide a
sympathetic account of his experiences as Solicitor General in the
Reagan administration, but to persuade us of the rectitude of the
broad premises on which the conservative revolution in constitutional
law is proceeding. The inconsistency of those premises with each
other and with plausible social outcomes is ori~ of the strongest reasons for rejecting the premises themselves.
The third reason is the problem of sugar-coating. By offering a
version of the conservative constitutional revolution that denies its
natural reach, Fried softens the political unacceptability of the views
he sponsors. But he twice asked the Supreme Court to overrule Roe v.
Wade, not to moderate its trimester-based protection of women suffering unwanted pregnancies. Had he succeeded, it is far from likely that
he would have returned to the Court and urged it to recognize those
qualified rights he now says women should have; and it is less likely
still that the Court, having accepted his basic position, would have
been moved to extend rights so obviously inconsistent with that
position.
We can only wonder how Fried himself would choose between his
conservative principles and his more appealing instincts were he a
judge.

20. See, e.g., pp. 77, 92-93, 115-16.

